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The difficulty of making a transition from an income-type to a
consumption-type tax is often cited as an obstacle to such a change in
policy. Put simply, the problem is the double taxation of "old savings" or
"old capital." A person who has accumulated wealth under an income tax
will be hit with an extra tax on the consumption financed by that accumula-
tion under a shift to a consumption tax. Such a transition effect raises
issues of equity, political feasibility, and efficiency. In the typical imple-
mentation of a consumption tax, the same sorts of transition phenomena
associated with a shift from an income tax follow from any change in the
rateof tax. That is, introduction of a consumption tax is the same as raising
the rate of consumption tax from zero to whatever positive rate is envi-
sioned for the new system. Consequently, the problem of transition to a
consumption tax generalizes to the problem of changing the rate of con-
sumption tax.
In this paper I consider the design of rules that render consumption
taxes in the family of business cash-flow taxes immune to the incentive
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and incidence effects of changes in rate of tax. I show that two fairly
simple approaches are available to deal with it: grandfathering the tax
rate applicable to a given period's investment, or substituting deprecia-
tion allowances for the usual expensing of investment, coupled with a
credit for the equivalent of interest on the undepreciated investment
stock. A cost of this approach is its requirement to identify true deprecia-
tion and, in the second case, the real rate of interest.
In general, imposition of a consumption-type tax will cause a one-time loss
to owners of certain assets. The loss will be spread over all wealth-owners to
the extent the transition is accompanied by an unanticipated increase in the
price level.
An anticipated introduction of a consumption tax, or an anticipated in-
crease in its rate, for which no compensating transition rule is provided, will
discourage saving and investing, encourage current consumption. (Bradford,
1996)
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper concerns a class of problems of implementation of and transi-
tion to consumption-type taxes. The specific issue that motivated this
paper is transition to what I have called (Bradford, 1986) a two-tiered
cash flow tax. The term refers to a two-component system. A single-rate
business-level tax applies to the real cash flow of business firms (so
investment is expensed), net of payments to workers. A personal-level
graduated-rate tax applies to the workers' compensation. A good exam-
pie is the flat tax, pioneered by Robert Hall and Alvin Rabushka (1983,
1995), which first brought this type of tax to my attention. In the flat-tax
system, graduation in the compensation tax takes the particularly simple
form of a tax-free allowance, based on family composition, together with
application of the same rate paid by businesses to all amounts in excess
of the exempt amount.1
Discussions of actual flat-tax proposals typically take for granted that a
new system would replace the old as of some transition date. It seems
much more likely, however, that if such a major change were to be
undertaken a new system would be phased in over time. At the price of
postponing the full achievement of whatever might be seen as the policy
gains from the shift, the myriad transition incidence effects might
1Other examples are my own loosely specified X tax (Bradford, 1982) and Charles McLure
and George Zodrow's simp1ied alternative tax, described in McLure, Mutti, Thuronyi, and
Zodrow (1990) and in McLure and Zodrow (1991).Transition to a Cash-Flow-Type Tax153
thereby be adequately muted.2 Phase-ins of tax changes are notorious
sources of complexity and opportunities for political machinations.I
have argued in the past, however, that there is a way of phasing in a
two-tiered cash-flow tax that would minimize these problems (Bradford,
1986, pp. 329-334). The simplicity of two-tiered cash-flow tax systems
makes the apparently unthinkable quite reasonable, namely, running
totally separate parallel tax systems for a period of years.3 The flat tax,
for example, requires little, if any, information not required for the
present-day income tax on individuals (including the tax on proprietors
and partners) and corporations. It could easily be incorporated as an
additional schedule on the existing individual and corporate tax returns.
One possibility is to calculate tax under both systems. For an initial
period, say two years, pay 80 percent of the bottom line of the present-
day income tax and 20 percent of the bottom line of the new tax. During
a second period, say the next two years, pay 60 percent of the bottom
line of the present-day income tax and 40 percent of the bottom line of
the new tax. At the end of this process, the tax is based 100 percent on
the new system and the old system can be discarded.4
Whatever the virtues of this adjustment process, it suffers from at
least one clear disadvantage in the form of more or less (depending on
the speed of the phase-in and the durability of the investment in ques-
tion) severe disincentives for new investment. By the same token,
disinvestment would be encouraged. New investment is immediately
deducted in the calculation of business income under the new system.
If the rate of tax were constant over time, by a familiar argument, the
expensed deduction would just offset the taxation of subsequent re-
turns for an investment that would barely break even in the absence of
tax. The tax would thus be neutral with respect to the investment
decision. But since the tax rate at which the deduction is made during
the phase-in period is lower than the rate applied subsequently when
2For a careful effort to model the trade-offs in alternative methods of introducing a re-
formed tax, see Zodrow (1981, 1985). Louis Kaplow (1986) and Daniel Shaviro (1997)
develop the (sometimes unexpected) pros and cons of providing protection against statu-
tory change.
Lyon (1992) notes the ubiquity of parallel systems. A good, although perhaps not very
happy, example is the alternative minimum tax for businesses and high-income individual
taxpayers. Michael Graetz (1983) even argued that the minimum tax might serve the
function of a bridge to a reformed income tax, along the lines of the process envisioned
here.
' The same transition plan could be effected by appropriate adjustments of all the rate and
credit parameters of the old and new systems. The plan description has, however, the
advantage of transparency.154Bradford
the investment's payoff comes in, a break even investment becomes a
loser.5
It is readily seen that the investment-discouraging effect of a rising
rate of tax during the phase-in to a cash flow business income base
would characterize an increase in the rate for any other reason, as well.
It is likely that policymakers will insist on having the option to change
the rate of tax. They may, however, want to avoid the windfall gain and
loss aspects of such changes. Taxpayers' anticipations of such changes
wifi furthermore generate potentially large incentive effects. The prob-
lem that I describe in connection with a phase-in to such a tax therefore
generalizes to a potentially serious problem of implementing a consump-
tion tax on an ongoing basis. This paper is devoted to a discussion of
methods of dealing with this problem.
In an appendix, I provide a formal model of the propositions devel-
oped verbally, but more generally, in the body of the paper. Through-
out, I confine my attention to the partial equilibrium assumption that
interest rates, and their generalization in a world with risk, are not
affected by changes I consider. I believe that a more sophisticated model-
ing taking into account general equilibrium repercussions of changes in
tax policy would not change the conclusions in any major way.
2. TAX-RATE VARIATION IN A TWO-TIERED CASH-
FLOW TAX
As described, for example, in Bradford (1996), a useful way to think
about a two-tiered cash-flow tax is to start with a subtraction-style value-
added tax. This is simply a tax at a single rate levied on all businesses, of
whatever legal form. The base of the tax is the nonfinancial cash flow of
the firm, that is, the difference between receipts from sales of goods and
services of all kinds and purchases from other business firms. A two-
tiered cash-flow tax simply modifies such a subtraction-style value-
added tax by permitting firms to deduct as well their payments to work-
ers (leaving the business tax). The payments to workers are, in turn,
subject to the compensation tax.
The intertemporal rate variation problem is starkly manifested by the
case of introduction of a subtraction-style value-added tax (the same
would hold for a European-style invoice and credit value-added tax). I
use a canonical example to convey the nature of the problem: a retail
An early discussion of the transition incentive problem is by Hall (1971). Hall has re-
turned to the subject in (1996) and (1997). The problem is also discussed in Sinn (1987) and
Howitt and Sinn (1989).Transition to a Cash-FlowType Tax155
store owner who buys a stock of canned tomato juice for $10,000 the day
before the tax goes into effect, with a rate, say, of 20 percent. If the
tomato juice is sold the day after the introduction of the tax, for roughly
$10,000 (I assume a hotly competitive retail sector), the owner of the
inventory will get to keep only $8,000 after tax. This is because the cost of
the goods sold is not allowed as a deduction. Rather, a deduction is
allowed only for current purchases by the business.
The short-term inventory example, for which the element of waiting is
negligible in the business calculation, gives a vivid instance of the impact
of a rate change. The effect is the same for assets other than inventory,
however. A person who bought a building the day before the introduc-
tion of the tax wifi suffer exactly the same loss, amounting to the new tax
rate times the amount paid for the building, even though the cash payoff
from holding the building may be years in the future. If that person were
to sell the building for its current market value (presumably the same as
the day before) the proceeds would be subject to the value-added tax.
That is the justification for the commonly held view that imposition of a
consumption tax imposes a one-time levy on "old wealth."
A typical statement of this position is my own, quoted at the head of
this paper: "In general, imposition of a consumption-type tax wifi cause
a one-time loss to owners of certain assets."6 I would note in passing that
the words, "owners of certain assets," were carefully chosen. The loser
in the tomato juice example is the owner of the inventory, who may not
be wealthy at all; the inventory might have been financed by the issue of
debt. That is why I went on to elaborate, "The loss will be spread over all
wealth-owners to the extent the transition is accompanied by an unantici-
pated increase in the price level." An unanticipated general price level
change, which is not a necessary concomitant of the introduction of a
value-added tax, would have the usual effect of penalizing net nominal
creditors. A price level change (unanticipated) in exactly the amount of
the tax, often taken for granted by commentators, would effectively
spread the transition tax over wealthholders in general. (So the illustra-
tive holder of debt-financed inventory would not suffer any transition
tax burden.)
Although my words were carefully chosen, they were, perhaps, not
sufficiently so. As has been pointed out to me by Daniel Shaviro, I could
equally well have written, "In general, imposition of an income-type tax
using a present-value depreciation scheme will cause a one-time loss to own-
6 Other examples include Gravelle (1995); Altig, Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and
Walliser (1997) show, in simulations of transitions to VAT, flat, and X taxes, how important
the issue may be.156Bradford
ers of certain assets." An example of a present-value depreciation
scheme is the proposal by Auerbach and Jorgenson (1980) to substitute
an up-front deduction at the time of acquisition of an asset equal to the
discounted value of future depreciation allowances, in place of the nor-
mal year-by-year depreciation deductions. Upon introduction of such a
system (or upon transition to it from the usual income accounting) there
would be a one-time loss to owners of business assets, exactly like the
tax on the inventory-holder in the example of a subtraction-style value-
added tax. Similarly, changes in the rate of tax in a system with
Auerbach-Jorgenson present-value depreciation would result in losses
(for a rate increase) or gains (for a rate cut) to owners of existing assets.
The transition effects are not due to the economic character of the tax but
to the method of its implementation.
2.1 Insulating against Tax-Rate Changes: Grandfathering
It seems evident in the case of a switch in methods of accounting for
depreciation in an income tax that the way to eliminate the transition-
incidence effect would be to do something like "grandfather" the deprecia-
tion allowances of assets acquired before the new system was introduced.
The same holds for the consumption-type tax. In the example of the
tomato juice inventory, grandfathering means looking back to the pur-
chase of the asset in the pre-transition period and allowing a current
deduction in the new system. Generalized to the broader system of in-
come accounting, grandfathering calls for allowing the owner a deduction
for the current market value of business assets. In a well-constructed
system of income accounting (including adjustment for inflation) this
would be called in income-tax jargon the "basis" (acquisition value less
cumulative depreciation allowances, for example) of business assets.
As I have emphasized, changes in the rate of a subtraction-type value-
added tax (or the business tax rate in a two-tiered cash-flow tax) generate
the same incidence and incentive effects as the transition from the no-tax
situation. Eliminating these transition effects can be accomplished by the
same grandfathering method as just described. Upon a change in the
rate, the owner would be allowed a credit in the amount of the product
of the basis of business assets and the increase in the rate of tax. So, for
example, an increase in the rate of tax from 20 to 25 percent would give
rise to a credit of 5 percent of basis.7
To serve the function of eliminating transition incentives due to tax-
rate changes, "economic" depreciationthe change in an asset's market
English and Poddar (1995) have developed a scheme along these lines to deal with rate
changes in a value-added tax that includes financial institutions.Transition to a Cash-FlowType Tax157
value during the periodis required. That is, there will be transition
incentives unless the basis of assets equals their market values. To imple-
ment the required grandfathering policy perfectly would require true,
inflation-corrected depreciation adjustments. Indeed, the accounting
really required is mark-to-market valuation. Suppose, for example, the
illustrative tomato juice inventory is purchased on day 2. On day 1, a
disastrous frost wipes out the tomato-juice crop, so the canned stock
jumps in market value from $10,000 to $20,000. On day 0, the new tax
goes into effect, and on day + 1, inventory is sold for $20,000. To make
the juice-holder whole requires a credit of 20 percent of $20,000, not 20
percent of $10,000 as historical-cost accounting would suggest.8
2.2 Insulating against Tax-Rate Changes:
Depreciation plus Interest on Basis
The requirement of good economic income accounting is clearly an obsta-
cle to practical implementation of insulating the system from rate-change
effects, on which I have a bit more to say below. Another obstacle seen by
many commentators who have considered a switch from an income- to a
consumption-based tax system is the huge one-time revenue cost due to
the write-off of the entire depreciation basis at the time of transition.
Viewed in terms of the long-term budget constraint, this revenue cost is
simply the requirement of avoiding the one-time extra tax on those af-
fected by the transition over what might, arguably, be considered the
intent of introducing the new tax.9 Because, however, the revenue cost
occurs in a lump at the time of introducing the consumption-based tax, it
is generally seen as posing a large fiscal challenge.
The solution to this problem is simple enough: The tax allowance
could be given in the form of government lOUs. That is, instead of
allowing an immediate write-off of basis at the time of transition, the
transition rule could provide a path of tax rebates or other transfers over
time with the same discounted value.10 This would be the equivalent of
8An instance of a somewhat similar transition phenomenon was the impact of lower rates
of tax, enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, on the return flow from assets for which
accelerated depreciation had been taken in earlier years. In that case, a windfall gain was
involved. Zodrow (1988) presents an analysis of the effort to neutralize this change.
The idea that consumption out of past accumulation "ought" not to be taxed is perhaps
most plausible in connection with a shift from an income tax, under which the past
accumulation has been taxed already. To be sure, some argue that an extra tax based on
past accumulation is a desirable policy objective (see, for example, Kotlikoff, 1992).
10Boadway and Bruce (1984) exploit this equivalence in their suggested design of a neutral
business tax.158Bradford
allowing the write-off and issuing debt, but would show up differently
in the fiscal bookkeeping.11
A particular form of this alternative policy turns out to have a very
convenient property of eliminating the need for specific adjustments to
take account of changes in the rate of tax. Under the alternative policy,
the taxpayer is allowed a deduction for the decline over time in the value
of business assets12 plus a deduction for the cost of carrying the capital
reflected in the value of those assets. Practically speaking, this implies
using income accounting for business income with the addition of a
capital cost allowance equal to the going rate of interest times the tax
basis in the business (including basis in inventory). (Since the objective
is a real-income measure, the depreciation and similar allowances would
be adjusted for inflation. Similarly, the interest rate applied to basis
would be a real, inflation-adjusted measure.13)
If the rate of tax is constant over the life of the investment, the sug-
gested policy is evidently equivalent to the expensing characteristically
associated with consumption taxation. The difference is that the tax
benefit ordinarily obtained due to expensing is received over time, with
interest. "Basis" is simply the part of the value of assets that has not yet
been taken as a deduction that "should" have been allowed, so the
taxpayer is compensated with an interest allowance.
With a constant rate of tax, all schemes that provide an interest com-
pensation for delayed receipt of benefits wifi be equivalent from the
point of view of the taxpayer. It may be less clear, but is true, that the
specific form, deduction of economic depreciation plus the interest rate
times the basis in business assets, is unique in incorporating just the
right adjustment to achieve neutrality in the face of intertemporal varia-
tion in the rate of tax. This point is perhaps best established by con-
sidering the alternative and most easily understood in the contest of
introduction of a new tax. Suppose the basis, reflecting the amount that
has not yet been allowed as a deduction (from the zero-rate tax), is
different from the market value of the asset. That is, suppose something
other than economic depreciation has been used in determining the
11Kotlikoff (1992) has emphasized the arbitrary nature of fiscal accounting as a system of
"labels" on cash flows.
12J apply the term "economic depreciation" to this amount, even though the adjustment
may involve something more than is suggested by this accounting terminology. In particu-
lar, the decline could be negative.
13 Essentially this method has been implemented in Croatia, as described by Rose and
Wiswesser (1997), who played a role in designing the new system. An important intellec-
tual predecessor was Wenger (1983).Transition to a Cash-Flow-Type Tax.159
amount subject to the new depreciation cum carrying-cost deduction. To
be specific, suppose depreciation is accelerated, relative to economic
depreciation, so that the basis is below market value. Now a tax is
imposed at a positive rate, which wifi stay constant in the future. The
taxpayer will obtain the equivalent, in present-value terms, of the deduc-
tion of basis at the transition date. But we know that deduction of the
market value of the asset is required to eliminate a loss in asset value at
the transition date, and therefore to eliminate the incentive to disinvest
prior to the transition date.
By a similar argument, if depreciation allowances for the pre-transition
period are below economic depreciation, the basis in the asset wifi ex-
ceed the market value at the transition point. Then the allowance at the
transition date, economically equivalent to write-off of basis at the new
tax rate, wifi be too high, in the sense that the taxpayer wifi experience a
jump in asset value and an extra incentive to invest prior to an antici-
pated transition. Economic depreciation, coupled with deduction of in-
terest on basis, is "just right" in a world of changing tax rates.
3. COMMENTARY
3.1 Measuring Depreciation
A very big drawback of both approaches is their requirement for well-
measured, inflation-corrected depreciation allowances. Currently, in the
United States there is no correcting for inflation in either tax or financial
accounts, in spite of arguably significant mismeasurement as a result.
One of the most serious obstacles to inflation adjustment is the appropri-
ate treatment of interest. Fortunately for the feasibility of the schemes
described in this paper, interest payments and receipts are not included
in the tax base. Adjustment of the purely real side of the accounts is
likely to be more manageable.14
Even inflation-corrected historical-cost accounts may still produce
rather poor approximations to current market values. In Bradford (1991)
I presented data on the ratio of the aggregate market value of equity in
U.S. corporations to the net worth of the U.S. nonfinancial corporate
business sector to the consolidated financial accounting measure of net
worth (incorporating Commerce Department data on the corresponding
inflation-adjusted capital stocks). Over the period 1948 to 1987 the ratio
varied widely, with a high (in 1968) of 110 percent and a low (in 1974) of
37 percent. Although one can reasonably quibble with the details of this
' For a discussion of the issues, see Shoven and Bulow (1975).160Bradford
calculation, it does suggest that historical-cost accounting is unlikely to
be a particularly accurate measure of current value.
One important source of divergence between any measure of the tangi-
ble assets of a business and the market value of that business are the
intangible assets with which they are combined. In the "information
age" it seems likely that intangible assets, such as trade marks, market-
ing skills, software copyrights, and so on, account for an increasing
fraction of wealth. Consider, for example, an investment in a marketing
campaign to promote the popularity of a brand of runring shoes. Under
present tax (and financial) accounting procedures, the outlays on the
campaign would be deducted currently, even though they are likely to
produce sufficient extra future profits to justify the expense. In tax jar-
gon, the basis in such an intangible asset is zero. Presumably, however,
the anticipation that a tax would be introduced between the time of
making the outlay and the realization of the payback would have the
effect of discouraging the investment. Short of marking the value of the
firm to market, there does not seem to be any practical way to avoid such
mismeasurements.
As in the income tax, there is a remedy available to the taxpayer with
basis different from market value: realize any gain or loss by selling the
asset. (I neglect here niceties of the limits placed by actual income-tax
rules on such transactions.) In a world without transaction costs, this
option (since it is an option) can only work to the taxpayer's advantage.
Such realization transactions have been sufficiently attractive in the past
in the case of residential real estate (where a differential between capital
gain and ordinary income tax rates was involved) to generate significant
activity. It can probably be taken for granted, however, that the tax
stakes are unlikely to motivate significant asset trading in the case of the
transition situations envisioned in this analysis.
The key requirement is to measure correctly the cumulative total in
real terms (hence the importance of inflation correction). If the cumula-
tive total of allowances adds up to the cost of the asset, the problems are
due to timing effects, which are important in an income tax but not in a
constant-rate cash-flow tax. In the context of a cash-flow company tax,
timing matters only when there is intertemporal rate variation. For tax-
rate changes of the sort one is likely to anticipate (compare, say, the rate
changes enacted in typical value-added tax systems), the distorting ef-
fects of mismeasurement should be minor. As is touched upon below, in
the case of the transition effects upon introduction of a two-tiered cash-
flow tax, there would, in addition, be offsetting incentives from the
residual income tax (which is on a realization basis).Transition to a Cash-Flow-Type Tax161
3.2 Special Aspects of the Transition from an Income Tax
The phase-in transition to a cash-flow tax discussed in this paper would
be accompanied by a corresponding phase-out transition from the in-
come tax. If the existing tax system were well modeled by an accrual
income tax, the latter process should be free of the transition incidence
and incentive effects examined here. This is because neutrality with
respect to intertemporal variation in the tax rate is a (not very well-
known) property of an ideal income tax. "Ideal" here means a mark-to-
market accrual tax, which perforce implies economic depreciation.15
The actual income tax differs, however, from the accrual ideal. Sepa-
rate taxes at the individual and corporate level and the intricate rules
relating to the financial structure of corporations greatly complicate the
problem of sorting out transition effects. This is why the gradual process
of transition might be attractive. The central phenomenon considered in
this paper is the incentive to alter investment owing to the interaction
with a changing rate of tax and the recovery of basis in business invest-
ments. The main "defect" of the income-measurement system in this
regard is accelerated depreciation of depreciable assets and complete
write-off of investment in "self-constructed" intangible property. Ordi-
narily, a declining rate of income tax works to increase the attractiveness
of such investments (and, in effect, to forgive taxes that would have
been expected on the return flow from past breakeven propositions). It
is a convenient property of the simultaneous phasing out of one tax and
phasing in of the other that this class of distortions under the imperfect
income tax would be roughly neutralized.
3.3 Concluding Comments
Three factors favor the depreciation-with-interest method over the grand-
fathering method of dealing with transition (and with the ongoing prob-
lem of rate changes). First, the former method would be effective in
neutralizing investment incentive effects in a situation in which the mar-
ginal rate of tax varies over time for an individual taxpayer. Grandfather-
ing requires keeping track of the time path of marginal rates, a possible
15The proposition that, provided a deduction for economic depreciation is allowed, the
choice among assets according to durability is undistorted by a flat-rate income tax is called
by Sinn (1987) the JohanssonSamuelson theorem, referring to Johansson (1969) and Samu-
elson (1964). Although Johansson (1969, p. 110) seems to have anticipated the fact that
these neutrality results carry over to the case of time-varying tax rates, Samuelson (1964)
did not. It was spelled out by Sandmo (1979) and Lyon (1990).162Bradford
complication. To be sure, the theoretical two-tiered cash-flow tax has a
single business tax rate applicable to all taxpayers at any time. In a real-
world application, however, there might well be limits on loss offsets and
similar features that would render the tax schedule nonlinear.
Second, grandfathering carries with it a large revenue cash-flow short-
fall at the time of introduction of a two-tiered cash-flow tax, with similar
lumpy effects at the time of any rate change. As discussed above, these
effects could be offset by granting a rebate in the form of a smoothed
stream of payments with the same present value. This would, however,
add a nontrivial complication to the operation of the system.
Third, because depreciation-with-interest-on-basis results in neutral-
ity toward business investment under a constant tax rate, regardless of
whether the depreciation allowances match the economic levels, this
method takes some of the pressure off of this difficult administrative
problem.16 Getting the timing of allowances wrong affects only the transi-
tion incentives. If the rate changes are small in the cash-flow tax (typical
rate changes in European value-added taxes might serve as a basis for
comparison), transition incentives would also be small unless the timing
deviation were very large. Adjusting allowances for inflation would re-
main critical, but since the appropriate adjustments are conceptually
fairly simple and would be the same for all assets, this may be less of a
problem.
The main disadvantage of the depreciation-with-interest method is
its requirement to identify the appropriate real discount rate. Conceptu-
ally, this choice is clear enough in the world without transaction costs
that underlie the investment model used in deriving the scheme. In
that world, the investor always has the option of financing with risk-
free debt. Everyone is indifferent between $1 now and $(l +i) a year
from now, where i is the risk-free interest rate. Since the government
guarantees the interest on postponed depreciation deductions, the ap-
propriate interest rate to use is the short-term government borrowing
rate (inflation-indexed).
To determine how this conclusion would be modified in the light of
more realistic assumptions about the financial environment would merit
exploration. Transaction costs could imply that an investment that would
be attractive in the absence of taxes, or with immediate expensing in a
cash-flow tax framework, could not be financed under the depreciation-
with-interest method. On the other hand, the value of the future tax
deductions would seem to be comparable as collateral to the asset itself.
More difficult to sort out is the influence of uncertainty about the reliabil-
16This is the point of Boadway and Bruce (1984).Transition to a Cash-FlowType Tax163
ity of the government's commitment not to change the policy.17 (Since the
policy could become more favorable, rather than less, the influence of this
form of risk on the investment decision is, perhaps, ambiguous.)
It is appropriate to conclude with this hint of the political process. This
paper concerns the possibility of carrying out a smooth transition from
the existing, messy income tax to a two-tiered cash-flow tax. The main
reasons one might want to undertake this transition are the superior
simplicity and neutrality properties of the new system. The warning
may bear repeating, therefore, that these attractive properties, which
result from the ability to exclude financial instruments from the tax
calculation and from the relatively simple business accounting, would
not necessarily be proof against a complex political process.18 Adding, as
the suggested transition scheme would, a requirement for inflation-
corrected depreciation and an allowance of interest on undepreciated
basis solves some problems but introduces others of a political nature,
since someone has to specify the depreciation rules and interest rate.
APPENDIX: FORMAL MODELING
In the body of this paper I have used verbal, although I believe general
and rigorous, arguments. In this appendix I present a mathematical
formulation of the results, using the exponential-decay model of capital
familiar to economists since at least the famous Hall and Jorgenson pa-
per (1967). A typical productive asset ("machines") is assumed, in effect,
to shrink over time to successively smaller replications of itself. A unit
machine of durability 6 is transformed by the passage of time into e
units of the same machine, where s is the time since putting the machine
in service. The set of available technologies is assumed to be represented
by machines of durabilities 08o. The value of the output, net of
other input costs, of machines of each durability is subject to diminish-
ing returns relative to the cost of the machine (which might be the
consequence of a diminishing price at which the particular good pro-
duced can be sold) and is detrmined in equilibrium.
The exponential-decay, or proportional-depreciation, model is com-
monly used for such analyses primarily because it can be manipulated
easily. It should be kept in mind, however, that there is no particular
reason to believe that it fits the facts of investment opportunities. As
1?For a study that demonstrates both the reality of risk of changes in policy and the
potential effect on investment incentives, see Auerbach and Hines (1987).
For an extended discussion of the political forces at work in alternative tax regimes see
Paul (1997) and my commentary (Bradford, 1997).164Bradford
discussed in the body of the paper, however, the conclusions reached
here with regard to the exponential-decay model carry over to a consis-
tent mark-to-market income measurement system.19
As is also typical, I assume a one-good world, in the sense that a unit
machine is assumed costlessly convertible into a unit of the single good.
It follows that the value of one unit of any machine depreciates at a rate
6e' at age s.
A.1 Rate Changes Unimportant under an Income Tax
A.L1 The Analjsis without Taxes Suppose a unit of asset of type 6
throws off an annual gross rental (gross of any depreciation in the ma-
chine but net of payments to any collaborating factors) of c(6). Then, in
the absence of taxes and risk, and with the option to borrow and lend at
interest rate i, a capitalist wifi value a unit asset of type 6 at
Jc(6)e8ds 0 i+6
Note that this is an arbitrage argument. The arbitrage is with the alterna-
tive opportunity by which the interest rate is defined, which I have here
represented as interest-bearing debt. If the asset could be purchased for
less than this demand price, by borrowing at the going interest rate, a
capitalist could purchase a machine and arrange for a net cash flow that
is positive over some time interval and never negative. Likewise, if the
going price of the asset is less than the demand price, the owner of a
machine could produce a strictly positive net cash flow over some inter-
val by a combination of selling the machine and lending the proceeds.
Since a unit machine costs 1, then for demand and supply for ma-
chines to be equated it must be true for each durability used,
c(8) i=c(6)-8.
The before-tax or social rate of return, r(6), is defined implicitly by the




19For proper income measurement, both the interest rate and any depreciation or similar
adjustments should be on an inflation-corrected basis.That is,
r(6) = c(6) - &
So with no taxes, the social rate of return on all machines of all
durabilities in positive use wifi be equal in asset market equilibrium, and
equal to the interest rate,
r(6) = i.
If the (instantaneous) interest rate is a known function of time, i(t),
instead of a constant, these expressions and ideas need to be general-
ized. Then, the equilibrium net rental thrown off by a unit machine wifi
also typically be a function of time, which I write as c(t) (changing the
argument from 6), and the demand price for an asset of durability 6 is
dds.
In general, the demand price of an asset now depends on the antici-
pated time path of future net rentals and interest rates. If, however, it is
anticipated that the net rental rates and interest rates wifi be related by
i(t) = c(t) - 6,
then he demand price will equal
J[i(s) + 6]efo dCds.




In the present case - e1 =0 and - e1° = 1; the demand price equals the
supply price, validating the fact that c(t) = i(t) + 6 wifi equate demand
and supply for machines. In this context we need also to substitute the
instantaneous social or before-tax yield,
r(t) = c(t;6)-8
for the yield-to-maturity formulation that is appropriate for the constant-
stationary-state story (where I have added the durability argument to the
expression for gross rental to emphasize that at any given time there wifi
be many margins of return to investment).
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A.L2 Adding Income Taxes As background for the analysis of con-
sumption taxes, it is useful to review the equilibrium conditions when
an income tax at rate m applies to gross rent, with an allowance for actual
("economic") depreciation and a deduction for interest (which is, in
turn, taxed to the recipient). By the same arbitrage argument as used
before (trading off the after-tax consequences of buying a machine with
the after-tax consequences of lending at taxable interest), in the station-
ary state, with constant interest and gross rental rates, the demand price
for a i.mit asset of durability 6 will be
f[(1 - m)c + m6]e_Eo+(l_m)ds=
(1 - m)c + m8
0 (1m)i+6
Equilibrium in asset markets requires that this demand price be equated




i = c - 6 = r(6)
for all 8. [Reminder: In equilibrium, c = c(8).] The implication that,
provided a deduction for economic depreciation is allowed, the choice
among assets according to durability is undistorted by an income tax is
called by Sinn (1987) the JohanssonSamuelson theorem.
It is important to be clear about what it is that is not distorted. In the
equilibrium with the income tax, the social rate of return, r, is equated
on all assets. This follows immediately from the observation that equilib-
rium requires that r(8) = i for machines of all durabiities employed in
positive amount. Given the interest rate i, the tax rate m has no influence
on the level of investment in machines of any durability. (As has been
mentioned, this result is general, and not dependent on the exponential
depreciation structure, although defining economic depreciation is not
so easy once one leaves the simple model. In particular, if investment is
irreversible, the time path of interest rates may matter. Risk is also likely
to play a more important role in the analysis. So long, however, as true
market value is used as the basis for the depreciation allowances, the
propositions discussed in this appendix wifi hold.) There is, however, a
distortion in the model due to the deviation between the after-tax yieldon savings, (1 rn)i, and the common before-tax yield on investment, r.
A change in the income tax rate will, in general, influence investment
levels via its general equilibrium impact on the desired stocks of wealth
and, hence, the interest rate. More important, there will, in equilibrium,
be a difference between savers' marginal rate of time preference and the
social rate of return on investment.
A convenient property of an income tax is that these neutrality results
carry over to the case of time-varying tax rates. Given the path of interest
rates, anticipated changes in the rate of a true income tax (with economic
depreciation) have no effect on the current level of investment. (In gen-
eral equilibrium one would expect tax-rate changes to produce changes
in the path of the interest rate, which would have an impact on asset
prices if investment is not reversible.)
To see how this conclusion emerges from the formal model, we exam-
ine the breakeven requirement for the case of a time-varying tax rate (for
simplicity, keeping the assumption of a constant interest rate). The de-
mand price for a unit asset of durability 6 wifi then be
I{[1- rn(s)] c(s) +rn(s)6}e__51_md ds.
Jo
As in the no-tax case with varying interest rate, the current demand
price depends upon current and future gross rental and net tax rates. We
can check that the condition i = c(s) - 6 will be an equilibrium relation-
ship; in this case, the breakeven condition would imply
j{[1 rn(s)] (i + 6) + rn(s)6}e_51mds
=f {[1 - rn(s)}(i) + 6}e8511m1 d ds.
As before, the integral is of the general form
ff'(s)efl ds = e
0
and, as before, e' = 0 and _eflb) = 1; the demand price equals the
supply price, validating the fact that c(t) = i(t) + 6 will equate demand
and supply for machines.
A.2 Rate Changes May Matter under a Business Level
Cash-Flow Tax
With a proportional cash-flow tax on business investment at rate rn,
constant through time, the net cash flow of a capitalist who purchases a
machine is simply a proportion 1rn of what it would be in the absence
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of the tax. The net-of-tax gross rental from a unit machine ("gross" here
refers to the treatment of depreciation) is reduced by the fraction m, but
so is the cost to the capitalist of buying the asset. By the same arbitrage
(with debt) argument as we used in the no-tax environment, the capital-




but because the net-of-tax cost to the capitalist of acquiring a machine is
1rn instead of 1, equilibrium still implies
i = c(6) - 3.
So, given the interest rate, the tax rate has no effect on investment. [Sinn
(1987) calls this result the Brown theorem, referring to E. Cary Brown
(1948).] Here the neutrality carries over to the saving decision as well as
the durability of machines in equilibrium. That is, in equilibrium, the
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of consumers equals the so-
cial rate of return.
Intertemporal variation in the interest rate affects this argument in
exactly the same way as it affected the story in the case without taxes.
Intertemporal variation in the tax rate is, however, another matter. The
tax rate determines the fraction of a newly purchased machine that is
financed by tax savings due to the expensing of the purchase. If that
fraction is not matched by the fraction of the future cash flow that is
taken away by the tax collector, an investment that breaks even in the
absence of taxes wifi no longer break even with taxes. If the future tax
rate is higher than the present rate, a breakeven investment becomes a
loser and it becomes a winner if the future tax rate is lower than the
present rate.
To take a simple example, suppose the business tax rate is rising over
time in such a way that the fraction of the payoff of an investment
retained by the owner declines at some multiple of the rate of interest:
1 - rn(s) = [1 - rn(0)]es.
Then the breakeven condition for an investment would be
J0[1 - rn(s)]c(3)e8ds= J[1 - rn(0)]c(6)e_5+ai1s ds= 1 - rn(0),
0which reduces to
(1 + a)i = c(6) -
The effect of the rising business tax rate is equivalent to an increase in
the interest rate. Its impact is identical to that of a uniform income tax.
Introduction of a cash-flow tax, from no tax, corresponds to in-
tertemporal variation in the business tax rate from zero to some positive
amount. If the introduction is unanticipated, owners of machines in
effect give up a fraction m of their assets. If the tax-rate change is antici-
pated, there are incentive effects on investment.
A.3 Neutralizing Transition Effects in a Business Cash-Flow
Tax Regime
We can use the exponential decay case to model the two methods of
neutralizing the transition effects described in the body of the paper:
Investment expensed and tax treatment "grandfathered."
Only economic depreciation allowed, instead of expensing, but with
an additional deduction equal to the rate of interest times the
undepreciated basis of business assets.
In both cases, there is assumed to be no taxation of interest received or
deduction of interest paid.
A.3.1 Method (1): Grandfather Tax Treatment The idea is to compen-
sate the investor for an increase in the tax rate, or to extract a payment
for a cut in the tax rate. In a discrete model, to grandfather the tax
treatment of past investment if the tax rate goes up from m(th) to m(t),
the owner of the asset is provided a tax rebate of m(t)m(th) times the
"unused basis" in the asset. The latter will (in equilibrium) be the
amount of the asset remaining after deducting economic depreciation
since acquisition. [This is speaking loosely. In this case, the basis is
actually zero, since the asset is expensed in method (1).]
In the instantaneous version of this method, with tax rate as a function
of time, m(t), there is a rate of rebate equal to m'(t) times the undepre-
ciated basis. If the rental rate c is constant, the basic economics of the
investment is described by
rent after tax:{[1m(s)] c+m'(s)} e';
machine costs:1m(0).
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Eliminating the opportunity for arbitrage profit requires
j{[1 - m(s)]ce' + m' (s)e}eds = 1 - m(0).
We know that with a constant tax rate the breakeven rental rate is given by
c=i + 6.
We need to check that this wifi still present a breakeven investment
opportunity when the tax rate is varying over time.
Integrating the left-hand side by parts,
[1 - -J
{[1 - m(s)}c - (i + 6) [1 - m(s)]}e ds
= [1 - m(s)]e:-{[1 - m(s)} [c - 6 i]}e8ds
= 1 -
Q.E.D.
A.3.2 Method (2): Economic Depreciation plus Interest on BasisIn
method (2) the investor pays income tax, using economic depreciation
rather than expensing of new investment, but there is allowed in addi-
tion a deduction for the cost of carrying the capital, in the form of the
rate of interest times the remaining basis. If the rental cost c is constant,
the cash flows are described by
rent after tax: {[1 - in(s)]c + m(s)(i + 6)}es;
machine costs: 1.
Eliminating the opportunity for arbitrage profit requires
j{[1 m(s)]c + in(s)(i + 6)}e ds = 1,
j[c - m(s)(c - i - 6)]e8ds = 1.
As before, use the fact that with a constant tax rate the breakeven rental
rate is given by
C= i + 6.




which we know to hold.Transition to a Cash-FlowType Tax171
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